

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

28 September 1984

National Intelligence Council

NOTE TO: Rob Simmons
Staff Director, SSCI


Rob-

Just a couple of observations about this estimate:

- The estimate originated from concern in the Intelligence Community that the policy people needed to take Mexico's problems more seriously. There was no pressure or even indications of particular interest from the policy community at all during the course of drafting and coordination.
- The original analyst draft surfaced considerable new information about problems in Mexico and the concern of the Director (and others of us in the process) was to ensure that these new thoughts and greater sense of concern not be so whittled down by the coordination process as to blunt the basic message of the paper -- that Mexico had some very serious problems and there was at least the possibility of destabilization there. You are aware of the danger of homogenization (mush making) that interagency coordination process poses. In this instance, ironically, we are trying to ensure that the point of view held by the DCI, CIA, Navy, NSA, FBI, Energy, Treasury, Special Air Force and the principal drafter did not get lost or significantly muted.



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- I think you will get a flavor of the toing and froing on this estimate by reading the first paragraph of the key judgements of the three documents we have provided you. The minutes of the NFIB also give you a flavor of the disagreements in the Community and that all points of view were represented. 

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RMG.
Robert M. Gates
Chairman

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Washington, D.C. 20505

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NOTE TO: Thomas Latimer
Staff Director, HPSCI


Tom -

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Bob.

Robert M. Gates
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